End-to-end ecryption doesn't defend against misrouting, although it does mitigate the damages of it. However, with our current CA system, nation level adversaries could easily MITM an encrypted connection that they have rerouted through their servers.

Right, "mitigate" is what I ought to have written.

And yes, HTTPS is rather a joke. But what about properly implemented SSH, IPSec or OpenVPN?

Why is HTTPS "rather a joke"? Genuinely curious...

Because your client (generally a browser) is configured to implicitly trust a group of companies called "root Certificate Authorities" (root CAs). Now, consider one such company head-quartered in China, or the US. The governments of both countries have the power to secretly demand such a company's keys, then use them to make your client trust whichever endpoint they chose.

That's still considerably better than sending unencrypted HTTP over the wire in pretty much every way.

Better, but not good enough.

The security model is broken, just like BGP's is. Root CAs plainly can't be trusted. It's not just that they'll cooperate with governments. See "Security Collapse in the HTTPS Market".[0]

[0] http://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2673311

If you can't trust your cert authorities, you are already rather fucked, routing errors or no.

Why should I need to trust some vague certificate authority? I'd rather trust DANE/TLSA and DNSSEC. Or something similar.

Solving the trust problem in routing would require ISPs to manually whitelist which AS advertisements are valid on any given interconnect - you know something is wrong if Comcast advertises some Virgin Media network, or whatever.

Encryption by itself can't solve trust. It can only protect against MITM.