I think at this point, those "other technologies to enforce security" are the main area of concern for io_uring users: if those other security layers don't know about io_uring they won't apply any restrictions to it.

Most users don't know what io_uring is, nor would they have read any of thosee articles. They are not HN readers with low-level understanding of operating systems workingm and don't even remotely have the knowledge of how any of these technologies work, nor do they have the time to get it. With a very few exceptions, users have to rely entirely on software vendors and service providers to do this for them, and trust they know what they're doing.

Yes, every security mechanism should be reviewed to validate it is applicable, i.e. I had a vulnerable version of node running but I wasn't using the particular aspect of node so it was a non-issue (and amazingly, IT sec agreed!).

But in the case of io_uring, it was outright bypassing other security layers. And while we all like to think we're running trusted services/code, we have to think about supply-chain attacks that may surprise us, or zero days, etc.

Oh sure, if you run your own server or sell your cloud as a service, you can enable it. But if you want to run on someone else’s setup, you have to play by their rules.

> Disabling io_uring because “guy on the internet said so” or “$faang_company says so” is beyond dumb.

I think it’s more like “$faang_company already disabled it in their hosts, so I am out of luck for my containers running on their cloud”